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Abstract
Background: There have been relatively few attempts to represent vision or blindness ontologically. This is
unsurprising as the related phenomena of sight and blindness are difficult to represent ontologically for a variety of
reasons. Blindness has escaped ontological capture at least in part because: blindness or the employment of the
term ‘blindness’ seems to vary from context to context, blindness can present in a myriad of types and degrees,
and there is no precedent for representing complex phenomena such as blindness.
Methods: We explore current attempts to represent vision or blindness, and show how these attempts fail at
representing subtypes of blindness (viz., color blindness, flash blindness, and inattentional blindness). We examine
the results found through a review of current attempts and identify where they have failed.
Results: By analyzing our test cases of different types of blindness along with the strengths and weaknesses of
previous attempts, we have identified the general features of blindness and vision. We propose an ontological
solution to represent vision and blindness, which capitalizes on resources afforded to one who utilizes the Basic
Formal Ontology as an upper-level ontology.
Conclusions: The solution we propose here involves specifying the trigger conditions of a disposition as well as
the processes that realize that disposition. Once these are specified we can characterize vision as a function that is
realized by certain (in this case) biological processes under a range of triggering conditions. When the range of
conditions under which the processes can be realized are reduced beyond a certain threshold, we are able to say
that blindness is present. We characterize vision as a function that is realized as a seeing process and blindness as a
reduction in the conditions under which the sight function is realized. This solution is desirable because it leverages
current features of a major upper-level ontology, accurately captures the phenomenon of blindness, and can be
implemented in many domain-specific ontologies.
Background
The human visual system is a complex, organized collec-
tion of specialized cells and structures that function
together to encode and represent one type of stimulus
(light). Light enters the system through the eye, a com-
plex organ that includes structural, optical, and muscular
components, which operate together to ensure an intact
focused image reaches the retina. In the retina, two types
of photoreceptor cells encode visual information in the
form of light by converting it to a neuronal signal. A
network of synapses connect the photoreceptor cells via
bipolar neurons, ganglion cells, horizontal cells, and
amacrine cells to the optic nerve, which connects to the
brain proper. Many of the fibers of the optic tract
innervate at the lateral geniculate nucleus in the poster-
ior thalamus while others project to the superior collicu-
lus. The lateral geniculate nucleus sends projection cell
axons to the visual cortex. The superior colliculus, in
addition to signals from the retina, receives indirect
signals from the visual cortex. The visual cortex is
composed of layers that are responsible for different
tasks. Most of the input from the lateral geniculate
nucleus occurs in layer IV of the primary visual cortex.
Cells in layer IV are connected in patterns that work
to integrate visual data from the lateral geniculate
nucleus into a cognitive representation of objects in
the visual field [1].
Because the human visual system involves many
anatomical structures and complex functions, it can fail
in a multitude of ways. Such failures can occur in any of
the various structures that make up the system, and
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often result in visual impairment or blindness. Blindness
has been studied from multiple perspectives, whether as
the result of accident or disease. Most of the associated
anatomical entities are well described, and many of the
affected processes involved in visual perception are well
understood; yet the representation of the fundamental
nature of blindness from an ontological perspective
remains incomplete.
In its most basic form, blindness is the impairment of
visual function below a certain threshold. Where this
threshold is set varies from context to context, and
standards for blindness vary across international and
institutional borders. The World Health Organization
characterizes blindness as visual acuity of less than 20/
500 or a visual field of less than 10 degrees. In the
United Kingdom, the Certificate of Visual Impairment
characterizes blindness as visual acuity of less than 20/
400. In the United States, the American Medical Associ-
ation characterizes blindness as visual acuity of less than
20/200 or a visual field of less than 20 degrees. There
have also been recent calls by the International Council
of Ophthalmology to define blindness and visual impair-
ment according to their own standards, at least part of
which involve visual substitution skills employed by
persons [2]. This expansion to include visual substitution
skills in the account of blindness is important because it
demonstrates that visual acuity only represents one
dimension of blindness. Other types of visual impairments
fall outside the scope of visual acuity—such as the ability
or inability to differentiate colors.
The relationships between blindness, visual impair-
ment, and visual acuity can be difficult to describe with-
out resort to fiat definitions, such as those described
above, which offer little insight into the underlying
nature of the phenomena. We start with the premise
that blindness is a specific type of visual impairment and
that blindness results from a failure in the visual process.
Visual acuity is the specific ability an individual has with
respect to vision (how well or poorly an individual is
able to visually process stimuli—or perhaps the sharp-
ness of the representations of external stimuli by an
individual). Many of the problems associated with repre-
senting blindness result from a conflation of closely
associated concepts about the vision process and its
absence. By identifying the entities in reality, the compo-
nents of the visual system and their associated functions
and processes, we may therefore sort out what blindness
is, and what blindness results from.
Current efforts to define terms related to blindness,
while systematic, are rather problematic. The National
Health Interview Service (NHIS) offers a definition of
'an individual who suffers from vision loss' as “those who
report they have trouble seeing [3].” The problem with
such a definition is that self-assessment is a reliably poor
criterion for sensory perception. People are often
mistaken about their abilities and skills regarding their
perception. An older NHIS survey, the National Health
Interview Survey on Disability (NHIS-D) implemented a
sharp cut-off for those who are legally blind, a visual
acuity of 20/200 or less. The American Community
Survey (ACS) provides a definition of those with
'difficulty seeing' as individuals who self-report either
blindness or “serious difficulty seeing even when wearing
eyeglasses [3].” Along with the aforementioned problem
with self-assessment we now have an additional problem
of qualification with corrective lenses. (Notice that this
definition is too vague in that even a person with ex-
ceptional vision could have serious difficulty seeing
when wearing glasses with a strong prescription; we
surely would not want to label such a person as
having difficulty seeing).
Governmental organizations implement their own
standards for blindness. The Department of Labor's
Bureau of Labor Statistics employs a Current Population
Survey as a means for identifying those who have serious
vision loss or blindness. The standard, once again, is one
of self-assessment. “People with vision loss were identi-
fied by the CPS if they reported that they or someone in
their household is blind or has serious difficulty seeing
when wearing eyeglasses [3].” One of the problems with
such wide-ranging definitions or criteria of blindness is
that there seems to be no one standard. As a result it is
very difficult to determine precisely how many people
suffer from blindness or vision loss.
From a diagnostic perspective, the National Eye Insti-
tute (NEI) defines ‘blindness’ as “the best-corrected
visual acuity of 6/60 or worse (=20/200) in the better
seeing eye [4].” The American Optometric Association
follows the protocol of the World Health Organization
in defining ‘total blindness’ as “no light perception” and
‘near total blindness’ as “a best-corrected visual acuity
of less than 20/1000 [5].” The standard United States
legal definition of ‘blindness’ follows the criterion
endorsed by the NEI, as a best-corrected visual acuity
of 20/200 or worse.
The problems that arise for a definition of ‘blindness’
date to at least the beginning of the 20th century. N.
Bishop Harman writes of a proposed definition of ‘blind-
ness’, “By no possible phrasing can we present a suffi-
ciently simple definition that will embrace the possible
variations in these several factors that make up sight,
and state that such and such a variation shall be accounted
blindness [6].” Other, more recent assessments of the feasi-
bility of defining ‘blindness’ have been met with similar
reluctance but somewhat more optimism. “The fact is,
however, that the briefest analysis of any dictionary
definition will reveal the word ‘blind’ to be neither
straightforward nor respectable [7]”.
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The aforementioned problems notwithstanding, there
are still difficulties surrounding blindness as a subject of
investigation. If we understand blindness as the impair-
ment of visual functioning beyond a certain threshold
and accept that there are many different ways in which
visual functioning can be impaired, then there are many
different ways in which one may be blind. Furthermore,
there are many different mechanisms that will cause
blindness. Moreover, if we focus on the different types of
visual impairment with respect to the features of the
world that are not effectively represented in the visual
process, ‘blindness’ can be used to describe these differ-
ent types of failures of representation along the lines of
features of the world (e.g. color blindness). This compli-
cates our task because it shows that not only are there
many different ways one can become blind, but different
ways in which one may be blind. The nature of blindness
is more complicated than it appears at first glance. Not
only are there complications with respect to contextual-
ized thresholds for determining blindness, but also diffi-
culty in examining the natures of the differing types of
visual impairment that lead to blindness.
There are two obvious and immediate challenges for
representing and defining visual impairment and blind-
ness. First, different groups use different standards of
measurement. Second, different standards of classifica-
tion can be used in conjunction with a single standard
of measurement. These challenges make it difficult to
share, reuse, and compare data on blindness and vision
related disorders. In addition, there are more complex
problems that arise in representing blindness in formal
ontology. This paper explores the difficulties that arise
in representing blindness ontologically and proposes a
novel solution to representing visual impairment and
blindness in a formal manner. While we believe that
the definition of ‘blindness’ (and its related terms) will
not come easily, our goal in this paper is to provide an
ontological representation of ‘blindness’ through a
careful examination of the nature of blindness and
related phenomena.
Current ontological representations of vision and
blindness
The Gene Ontology defines ‘visual perception’ as “The
series of events required for an organism to receive a
visual stimulus, convert it to a molecular signal, and
recognize and characterize the signal. Visual stimuli are
detected in the form of photons and are processed to
form an image [8].” Thus, visual perception, or seeing, is
a relational process between an agent and the stimulus
itself. The process of seeing is representational insofar as
the agent represents the stimulus in some manner (we leave
the source of this stimulus and the nature of this represen-
tation to further examination). We may characterize the
diminishment or cessation of this relational process as
blindness or a loss of vision.
Currently there are relatively few ontologies that
contain the term ‘blindness’ and fewer still that offer a
well-formed definition of ‘blindness’. There are no
realism-based ontologies that represent the phenomena
surrounding blindness in a manner that reflects its
complexity. Results of previous attempts to characterize
blindness using current ontologies are listed in Table 1.
Of the attempts to represent blindness in biomedical
ontologies, it is a popular strategy to classify blindness
as a phenotype [9].
Biomedical ontologies that seek to represent pheno-
types typically rely on Entity-Quality (EQ) methodology
[10]. The EQ methodology leverages the existing struc-
ture of ontologies to generate a schema where the sub-
ject of the phenotype (the entity) is described by the
phenotype that inheres in that entity (the quality). This
approach is advantageous in that it provides a computa-
tional resource for researchers working with phenotypic
qualities. This allows researchers to leverage reasoners
where they were not leveraged before. In addition, the
EQ method allows that “[phenotypes be] recorded
using multiple ontologies in a highly expressive and
finely detailed manner while maintaining correct logic
and computability [10].” This is a very powerful and
innovative method used within the biomedical ontol-
ogy community.
The EQ methodology works well for phenotypes and
qualities that inhere in entities. For example, if we
wanted to say, “some human being has red eyes”, we could
accomplish this via EQ methodology by leveraging terms
from the Uber Anatomy Ontology (UBERON) and the
Phenotype and Trait Ontology (PATO). We would use the
terms ‘red’ from PATO and ‘eye’ from UBERON and apply
the EQ methodology to yield EQ =UBERON:eye +
PATO:red [10].
While this solution has its advantages, its shortcomings
outweigh its advantages for the subject of blindness. The
main problem with applying the EQ method to blindness
is that it is unclear whether blindness is a phenotype. The
Ontology for General Medical Science (OGMS) provides
the following definition for ‘phenotype’:
A (combination of) quality(ies) of an organism
determined by the interaction of its genetic make-up
and environment that differentiates specific instances of
a species from other instances of the same species [11].
If blindness is a phenotype and phenotypes are qualities
(or combinations thereof), then blindness is a quality (or
combination thereof). If blindness is a quality (or combin-
ation thereof), then blindness is a specifically dependent
continuant that needs no further process in order to be
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realized. But this consequence is incorrect—blindness is
the inability of the vision function to be realized. Blindness
is not a quality of a visual system or of an organism that
the visual system is part of. Blindness is a failure in the
realization of the visual function.
Another option to consider is an alternative definition
of ‘phenotype’. One standard definition for ‘phenotype’
is that a phenotype is the outcome of a given genotype
in a particular environment [12]. If it is the case that
blindness is a phenotype and that a phenotype is the
outcome of a given genotype in a particular environ-
ment, then blindness is the outcome of a given genotype
in a particular environment. Of course this poses no
problems when we are discussing instances of blindness
with a genetic basis. However, some instances of
blindness do not have a genetic basis, but rather are
the result of acute trauma or some other non-genetic
phenomenon. Since there are cases of blindness that
have non-genetic bases, it is clear that blindness is not
a phenotype in all cases according to this definition of
‘phenotype’. Since blindness is not a phenotype in all
cases (if any), we should look for an alternative
account of blindness.
One of the general problems with the treatment of
blindness as a phenotype (quality) is that it is inconsist-
ent with the proposed definitions provided in these
accounts. If blindness is a lack of sight (or vision) and
sight (or vision) is a realizable entity, then blindness
should be the lack of a process or the lack of some
realizable entity. If blindness is a phenotype and there-
fore a type of quality, then there is a quality that is a lack
of a realizable entity. But this is impossible. There
cannot be an entity that is both a lack of a realizable
entity and a quality at the same time. The lesson here is
not that blindness does not exist but rather that
blindness is something other than a phenotype.
If blindness is not a phenotype, what other ontological
solutions are there? One of the most likely candidate
solutions involves using the Human Disease Ontology
(DO). The Human Disease Ontology currently does not
provide a definition of 'blindness', but we could propose
a plausible candidate on their behalf following their
characterization of color blindness as an inability or
decreased ability to detect light stimulus. 'Color blind-
ness' is defined in DO as: “a blindness that is character-
ized by the inability or decreased ability to see color, or
perceive color differences, under normal lighting condi-
tions [13].” (Table 1) Moving from this definition of a
specific type of blindness to a general definition of blind-
ness should produce the result that blindness is “the
inability or decreased ability to see or perceive, under
normal lighting conditions”.
While this is a generally attractive view, it does not
stand up to careful examination. In the first place, DO
Table 1 Previous attempts to define and represent blindness
Ontology Term Definition Parent Class
Gene Ontology (GO) Visual perception The series of events required for an organism to receive
a visual stimulus, convert it to a molecular signal, and
recognize and characterize the signal. Visual stimuli are
detected in the form of photons and are processed
to form an image.
Sensory perception
of light stimulus
GO Detection of visible light The series of events in which a visible light stimulus is
received by a cell and converted into a molecular signal.
A visible light stimulus is electromagnetic radiation that
can be perceived visually by an organism; for organisms
lacking a visual system, this can be defined as light with
a wavelength within the range 380 to 780 nm.
Detection of
light stimulus
GO Detection of light stimulus
involved in visual perception
The series of events involved in visual perception in





The determination of the type or quality of a sensation.
Sensory modalities include touch, thermal sensation,
visual sensation, auditory sensation and pain.
Sensory processing
Mammalian Phenotype (MP) Blindness Loss of the sense of sight. Abnormal vision
MP Abnormal vision Inability or decreased ability to see. Abnormal eye physiology
MP Decreased visual acuity Loss of visual acuity or ability to distinguish small details Abnormal visual acuity
Human Disease Ontology (DOID) Blindness N/A Retinal disease
DOID Color blindness A blindness that is characterized by the inability
or decreased ability to see color, or perceive color
differences, under normal lighting conditions.
Blindness
Human Phenotype (HP) Blindness Blindness is the condition of lacking visual perception
due to physiological or neurological factors.
Visual Impairment
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categorizes blindness as a disease. Blindness is not a dis-
ease though it may result from a particular disease.
Moreover, it is not a type of retinal disease as DO
currently represents it. There are many diseases that
may result in blindness and many diseases can compli-
cate the sightedness of individuals, but blindness is not
itself a disease. Furthermore, blindness need not result
from a disease. It may instead be caused by a single
event, as is the case with acute trauma or flash blind-
ness. Blindness also need not be limited to problems in
the retina. Cortical blindness is a type of blindness that
does not involve any malfunction with the retina. As
detailed in the last section, certain types of blindness are
not limited to just one mechanism of realization, or to
realization in only one location.
These problems notwithstanding, the more pressing
concern with this solution is that there does not seem to
be any indication of what an inability or decreased ability
would be. If abilities are dispositions or functions, then
they are realizable entities. The concern is plain—accord-
ing to BFO a realizable entity cannot lack. Realizable
entities cannot present in degrees, as their existence is an
all-or-nothing affair. If blindness is an inability to detect
light, then all cases of blindness will be a complete inabil-
ity to detect light stimulus, which fails to capture the cases
of blindness that are not the complete inability to detect
light stimulus. If blindness is a decreased ability to detect
light, then it cannot be represented as a decreased func-
tion or disposition in BFO. But, if sight is a function and
blindness is the lack of sight, then an account of blindness
as an inability cannot be given either. Hence, we believe
that this type of account is confused.
Moving away from an account based on the DO repre-
sentation, another route for capturing blindness is to main-
tain that blindness is a disorder, where 'disorder' is defined
by OGMS as “[a] material entity that is clinically abnormal
and part of an extended organism [11].” The problem with
this approach is that it is unclear that blindness is a material
entity. If one thinks that blindness is the absence of the
sight function, then it does not seem that blindness is a ma-
terial entity (absences of functions are not material entities).
Further, one cannot point to a material entity and identify it
as blindness because blindness is not spatially extended and
spatial extension is a hallmark of material entities. For these
reasons, blindness cannot be a disorder per OGMS.
The realist approach to blindness
There are several lessons to be learned from this concise
review of the representations of blindness in biomedical
ontologies. First, it is rather difficult to characterize an
entity via a lack or absence, which seems to be the case
with blindness (the lack of sight) [14]. Consider the
paradigm case of an ontological absence involving
material entities: a hole. There does not seem to be
anything to which one can attribute characteristics. In
the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO), holes are continuant
entities susceptible to characteristic ascription like ma-
terial entities, but are essentially non-material. This indi-
cates at least a prima facie problem with characterizing
entities via a lack. BFO is an upper-level ontology that is
realist, fallibilist, perspectivalist, and adequatist [15]. The
core of BFO lies in its distinction between
continuants and occurrents, which tracks the differ-
ence between the two different types of fundamental
entities in the world. BFO is currently used as the
upper-level ontology for many biomedical ontologies
and is the backbone of the Open Biological and
Biomedical Ontologies collaborative [16].
A second problem arises when we consider attempts
to capture the existence conditions of a hole. If a hole is
defined by a lack (where the lack is both necessary and
sufficient), then there are all sorts of things that would
qualify as a hole. For example, if one were to characterize
a hole as a lack of matter surrounded by matter, then the
interior of a room would count as a hole, as would the
inside of a bag. A strategy has been implemented in
anatomy for representing lacking a part; however, it is
contentious whether it will translate well for things that
are not material entities, such as processes or functions 1
[17]. The reason that such a strategy will not work well
for non-material entities is that the lacks_part relation
does not apply to functions because functions do not have
parts. 2 Processes, on the other hand, do have parts but
the parts are temporal parts, not material entities (pro-
cesses can include material entities as participants, but
these are not themselves parts of processes).
Blindness does not seem to yield a precise definition
or even clearly differentiated conditions under which it
is present or absent, apart from the fiat standards
discussed previously. Blindness often presents gradually
which is commonly due to degeneration of the eye or
apparatuses associated with vision. As a result, many
cases of blindness are progressive and it is exceedingly
difficult to determine at which point blindness has come
into existence. In addition to these complications, there
is controversy over the threshold for blindness. Hence, it
is common for publications regarding blindness to
specify which definition of ‘blindness’ they employ [18].
Even given these complications regarding blindness,
we contend that it is useful to give a univocal account of
the phenomenon for purposes of ontological deve-
lopment. Such an account should capture all or a vast
majority of the cases of blindness and the various
classifications of blindness found in the literature.
Thus, the account should remain general and flexible
enough to capture a wide range of characterizations yet
it should also be rigid enough to remain informative
and insightful.
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There are many types of blindness. For example, there
is color blindness and change blindness. Blindness can
also be defined relative to a context. An individual might
be legally blind but still be able to detect some light
stimulus. Similarly, one might be visually impaired to
the extent that they are prohibited from flying a jet
aircraft but not from driving. Hence, we might say that
someone is ‘blind according to [x]’ where [x] is some
standard of evaluation for sightedness. In this sense,
blindness comes in degrees. The extent to which some-
one has a lack of vision will be graded. If we think of
seeing as a relational process between an agent who is
representing and the thing represented and assess the
accuracy of such representations on a scale of 1 to 0
(complete representational veracity to no representa-
tional veracity), the ability of the person to see will be
somewhere on the continuum from 0 to 1—the closer to
0 one’s representation of the stimulus is, the more blind
that individual is.
Lending to the confusion surrounding the status of
blindness (and vision) is the method used for assessing
visual acuity. Typically, visual acuity is expressed as a re-
lationship between two values—the distance a subject
stands from an optical chart and the distance at which a
normal subject would stand from the chart to discern
the same visual detail. Putting aside the problems
associated with this particular type of visual acuity
assessment, we have discussed above how this can
lead to confusion regarding what conditions are indi-
cative of blindness [18].
Given the above considerations, one might conclude
that there is not a single coherent ontological category
that corresponds to what blindness is as an entity.
Instead, blindness could be an amalgam of loosely related
entities or something that is not ontologically well-
formed. We find this conclusion unsatisfactory. It is useful
for clinicians and researchers to have a coherent theory of
blindness that encompasses the range of conditions
commonly understood to be forms of blindness. We
simultaneously realize that blindness seems to be charac-
terized as relative or context-sensitive (the term itself
might be context-sensitive or the phenomenon might be
context-sensitive or both). We favor the view that the
term ‘blindness’ denotes a single phenomenon reflecting
severe visual impairment relative to a particular context of
evaluation. Thus, ‘blindness’ denotes an ontologically well-
formed category.
According to BFO, a function is a type of disposition.
A disposition is a realizable entity whose realization
occurs in virtue of the bearer’s physical constitution and
because the bearer is in some special physical circum-
stances. A function is a disposition that exists as the
product of natural selection or intentional design on the
part of the agent. Because functions are dispositions they
are realizable entities. They are realized as processes that
are sometimes called ‘functionings’. Functions are regarded
as non-accidental in BFO meaning that they come into
being because of natural selection or intentional design
[19]. All of the functions a given entity possesses are
intimately tied to the type of entity under examin-
ation, whether the entity is biological or artifactual.
Functions are internally-grounded realizable entities.
An internally-grounded realizable entity “…is a realizable
entity that is a reflection of the (in-built or acquired) phys-
ical make-up of the material entity in which it inheres
[19].” Changing the physical structure of an entity that
bears a given function might alter the realization of the
function in question.
A reason to believe that sight is a disposition is that it
is realized by processes grounded in a material entity.
This is a hallmark of a disposition (of which functions
are a special type) as described above. We have another
reason to think that sight is a disposition: the fact that
if sight ceases to exist, then the bearer is physically
changed. Although the entities still have the dispos-
ition to see, they are blind because they can no longer
realize that disposition due to some change in their
physical constitution.
Furthermore, we believe that sight is a function of a
visual system (or at least of visual systems of entities
with higher-order cognitive functions). One reason is
that development of the ability to see is the result of an
evolutionary process. The physical makeup of particular
organisms have changed and adapted over time to select
for the existence of the sight function. For non-biological
entities possessing sight, if any, the sight that they possess
is not accidental, but rather a product of intentional
design on the part of the creator. For these reasons,
we contend that sight is a function.
It is important to note here that it is not the case that
for all instances of structural change in the bearer of a
function that the function ceases to be realizable. In
other words, it is not the case that every physical change
in a bearer alters the function in question. It is also the
case that some bearers of functions can undergo changes
that render them unable to realize a function while the
function persists in its bearer. For example, one of the
functions of the human heart is to pump blood. Physical
changes to the heart may cause the heart to be unable to
perform its function—a large tear in a ventricle wall
might be such a physical change. Other physical changes
might not cause the loss of the ability to perform a func-
tion—a slightly enlarged section of muscle might be
such a physical change. But in all cases where a function
ceases to exist or comes into being there must be a
corresponding physical change. To use an artifactual
example, a radiator has the function to disperse heat.
Certain physical changes to a radiator will render the
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radiator unable to realize its function, such as the
presence of corrosion on the cooling fins or a cracked
regulator valve. But in this case we would not say that
the radiator has lost its function, rather we would say
that its function cannot be realized. If there were a suffi-
ciently significant physical modification of the right kind
to an entity, only then would we contend that the
function ceases to exist. This is an important point
that will play a significant role later in our discussion
of blindness.
We can characterize the specific type of function (sight)
by identifying and describing its defining features.
Employing such a strategy, we provide an account of sight
as the function to receive photons and interpret them as
visual information. Similarly, we can characterize seeing as
the process by which photons contacting the retina are
coded into an action potential and interpreted as visual
information. Having given an account of vision as the
realization of the sight function, it is then natural to iden-
tify the processes by which the sight function is realized as
vision. There are many other functions involved in the
realization of the sight function as described above. We
are omitting detailed discussion of these functions for ease
of exposition.
If we are correct in our claim that sight is a function,
and that blindness is related to the realization of this
function, then it seems that we can develop our under-
standing of the phenomena of blindness through the
characterization of sight as a function. Because blind-
ness is a wide-ranging phenomenon (i.e., there are
many types of blindness), it would behoove us to
explore the range of blindness types in an attempt to
fully capture blindness.
Color blindness
Color perception is possible for humans because we
(typically) have three different types of cone cell photo-
receptors that detect photons within corresponding
ranges of wavelength. Photons within the range of a
particular type of cone cell photoreceptor cause an
action potential in the corresponding cone cell and the
action potential is sent along eventually to the primary
visual cortex. Color is coded by the differentiation of the
firing of these types of cone photoreceptor cells.
Color blindness is a condition wherein an individual has
an inability to distinguish between two or more colors. In
some cases photons of differing color spectrum wave-
length are represented or interpreted as the same when
they are distinct. In other cases, an individual cannot
report a difference between two or more wavelengths of
photons [20]. The inability to distinguish between two or
more types of light is not limited to just one cone type
[21]. Complicating this picture somewhat is that there are
many mechanisms identified as causes of color blindness
and that these mechanisms are not localized to one
anatomical region. Some color blindness is due to an indi-
vidual lacking cone cells or a certain type of cone cell.
Other times the cause is cortical [22]. For example, the
complete lack of the ability to distinguish colors, achroma-
topsia, can have its underlying causal mechanism
located within the retina (congenital achromatopsia)
or the visual cortex (cerebral achromatopsia). Thus
color blindness is similar to other types of blindness
in that its causes and the mechanisms associated with
it are diverse and complex.
Flash blindness
Flash blindness is a type of blindness that results from
sudden exposure to bright light—such as the bright flash
that results from the flash bulbs on older cameras or the
detonation of an atomic weapon. The sudden influx of
light oversaturates the photopigments of the retina and
the individual becomes unable to convert photons to a
neural signal [23]. Flash blindness is commonly tempor-
ary, where the subject regains their full ability to see
within a few minutes. There are some extreme cases,
however, where flash blindness results in permanent
vision loss [24].
Inattentional blindness
Inattentional blindness can be described by an individ-
ual’s lack of perception of a salient object or feature in
their visual field due to lack of attention [25]. Investiga-
tion into the mechanism for this phenomenon has
revealed both a nonconscious and conscious component.
The nonconscious mechanism includes contour inte-
gration in the early visual cortex while conscious
integration includes involvement from the lateral
occipital cortex and is mediated more strongly by
focused attention [26].
Proposed solution
Drawing on the lessons from the previous sections, we
propose a solution to the problem that blindness poses
for ontology development. Because sight is a function
and blindness is seemingly the non-realization of that
function, we set forth an account of blindness where
blindness is a reduction of the trigger conditions under
which the sight function is realized. To understand this,
we need to understand how dispositions are related to
triggering conditions. “A disposition is a causal property
that is linked to a realization, i.e., to a specific behavior
which the individual that bears the disposition will show
under certain circumstances or as a response to a certain
stimulus (trigger) [27]”.
This solution is able to deal with the cases outlined
above. Color blindness is a reduction in the (color)
trigger conditions under which a vision function is
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realized. Although different types of color blindness will
involve different types of reduction of conditions, they
are unified as a single phenomenon by the fact that they
all involve the reduction of the number of particular
light wavelengths that result in differentiated visual
representation. For flash blindness, we say that there is a
temporary (or possibly permanent) reduction in the
conditions under which the vision function is realized,
whatever the mechanism realizing the function of
sightedness may be. It may be that cases of temporary
flash blindness are impairments of functions in the
following manner: they are grounded in a physical
change that results in a malfunction but not a (per-
manent) loss of a function. Because the function is
realized by a rather complicated functioning in both
cases, the type of blindness can range over different
types of failure in functioning so long as the reduction
of conditions is similar.
The case of inattentional blindness is interesting and
problematic. It is unclear whether the inattentional
blindness is a type of blindness or the use of the term
‘blindness’ is metaphorical. If it is not the case that inat-
tentional blindness is a type of blindness, then we need
not worry about its formalization. If, however, intatten-
tional blindness is a type of blindness, then we propose
the following formalization: inattentional blindness is an
instance of a non-realized disposition (the vision func-
tion is non-realized). The disposition will not be realized
in one of two ways: nonconsciously by some mechanism
of contour integration in the early visual cortex or
consciously by failure of function by the lateral occipital
cortex. This is why inattentional blindness is much like
more traditional types of blindness even though its
mechanism and presentation differs from these trad-
itional types of blindness. One could also classify types
of blindness by the types of failure in sight functionings,
if one so chose.
Having provided an informal account of what consti-
tutes blindness we now provide a formalization of the
solution. Because our account relies heavily on triggers,
dispositions, and processes realizing those dispositions,
any formalization will have to invoke all of these at a
minimum. We can characterize triggers, dispositions, and
processes realizing dispositions in the following man-
ner. Dispositions exist outside of their realizations—the
disposition of fragility inheres in a vase whether or not
it there is a process of shattering to realize that dis-
position. Some dispositions exist without any realiza-
tions—that is to say, there are some dispositions that
will never be realized because the triggering conditions
are not met. Realizations are processual entities and
have as participants the material entities. Dispositions
and qualities inhere in material entities. For dispositions,
then, we can identify the following features.
Dispositions, triggers, and background conditions
The relationship between triggering conditions, disposi-
tions, and realizations described above is over-simplified.
Keep in mind that the dispositional account given
characterizes dispositions as non-probabilistic and their
associated phenomena as straightforwardly accessible. In
reality, many dispositions are most likely probabilistic
and the precise nature of their associated phenomena
(triggering conditions, realization processes) is currently
unknown. This should not deter one from seeking to
give an account of dispositions, triggers, and realization
processes, however. One of the more attractive accounts
proffered is from Rohl and Jansen [27]. According to
this account, there is a primitive (undefined) relation
(has_triggerR) that holds between the triggering process
and the realization process. The relationship between the
disposition and the triggering process is defined in terms
of that primitive relationship as follows:3
d has triggerDt iff : there exists some r
dhas realization r and r has triggerRtð Þ
Roughly, this says that some particular disposition has
a particular trigger just in case there is some realization
process such that the particular disposition has that
realization process and that realization process has some
trigger. We would then say that the particular dispos-
ition in question has that particular trigger. This is an
instance-level relationship. An example of such a rela-
tionship would be the fragility of a vase. The particular
disposition a vase has for shattering is realized by some
instance of a realization process (a shattering process),
which is triggered by some particular triggering event,
e.g., a dropping process. The relationship between the
particular realization process that realizes the disposition
and the process that triggers or precedes the realization
process is irreducible.
Once there is a relationship between the instances of dis-
positions and triggers, it is rather straightforward to extend
this to types of dispositions. Following Rohl and Jansen, this
relationship can be captured in the following manner:
Dhas triggerDT¼DEF∀ ð instance ofD ⊃ ∀y
 has triggerDy ⊃ y instance of Tð ÞÞ
This definition is at the level of types. It specifies the rela-
tionship between disposition types and triggering process
types. In a similar manner the relationship between
realization types and triggering types can be captured:
R has triggerRT¼DEFfor ∀  ð instance ofR ⊃ ∃y
y instance ofT  has triggerRyð ÞÞ
This relationship holds between realization process
types and triggering process types. Since dispositions
involve triggering processes, realization processes, and
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dispositions themselves, it is essential to capture the
relationships between these three entities. The above
relationship specifications do just that. To see how this
works in our case of vision, consider the following
relation for the vision of an individual:
Agent x’s disposition for vision has_triggerD particular
lighting conditions iff: there exists some neural processes
of agent x (agent x’s disposition to see has_realization
neural processes of agent x and neural processes of
agent x has_triggerR particular lighting conditions).
The relationships would then exist at the universal level:
Vision Disposition has_triggerDLighting Conditions
(range of light wavelengths) = DEF ∀x (x instance_of
Vision Disposition ⊃ ∀y (x has_triggerD particular lighting
conditions ⊃ particular lighting conditions instance_of
Lighting Conditions (range of light wavelengths)).
Photon to Neural Signal Transduction has_triggerR-
Lighting Conditions (range of light wavelengths) = DEF for
∀x (x instance_of Photon to Neural Signal Transduc-
tion ⊃ ∃y (y instance_of Lighting Conditions (range of
light wavelengths) & x has_triggerR y)).
4
The above specifications may be complex but have a
number of advantages. First, they capture the processes
that underlie dispositions and the dispositions them-
selves, which allows for more accurate modeling.
Second, this approach accounts for all of the processes
(or at least all of the relevant processes) involved in
dispositions. Approaches that do not account for all of
the relevant processes involved in dispositions will be
incomplete. Third, it leverages BFO as an upper-level
ontology and inherits all of the benefits therein. Namely,
using BFO provides a realist framework for modeling
biomedical entities of interest and provides pre-theoretical
interoperability with other biomedical ontologies that also
employ BFO as an upper-level ontology.
Possible objections
One possible objection to this account is that since
blindness is a reduction in the range of conditions under
which a disposition is realized, blindness is extrinsic to
the agent that is blind. So, according to our account,
turning off the lights is sufficient to make someone
blind. The thrust of this objection being that the reduc-
tion of triggering conditions is extrinsic to the agent, but
blindness is a phenomenon that is intrinsic to an agent.
Therefore our account is incorrect
We think that this objection is confused. The confu-
sion here is one between the presence of the conditions
and the range of conditions. To take an example, water
has a disposition to freeze at or under a certain
temperature at a given level of atmospheric pressure
(which just happens to be a range of conditions under
which the freezing process is realized). The temperature
constitutes a triggering condition for the freezing
disposition. Lowering the temperature brings the dispos-
ition closer to realization due to the change in the exter-
nal environmental conditions, but it does not mean that
water freezes at a lower temperature. Nor does this
change the disposition that water has to freeze. It is not
that the range of conditions that changed, rather that
the conditions themselves changed. The conditions
under which a disposition is realized are external to an
entity, much like the range, but these two things are
independent of one another. Conditions themselves can
change without the range of conditions changing, as is
the case with reductions in triggering conditions. In this
way we can see that turning off the lights does not
constitute a reduction in the range of conditions for
which a sight function is realized. Rather, it only con-
stitutes a reduction in the actual lighting conditions
in that situation.
There is an important point to be gleaned from this
objection, however, in regard to a concern over the
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties
and whether blindness is intrinsic or extrinsic. We have
no reason to suppose that blindness is either intrinsic or
extrinsic, at least not pre-theoretically. The reduction in
the range of conditions under which the vision function
is realized is due to a change in the physical basis of the
bearer of the function. This, we believe, accounts for the
intuition that blindness is an intrinsic property. Indeed
our account of blindness is compatible with this obser-
vation, so those who believe that blindness is intrinsic
should not be hostile to our view. We leave further
discussion of intrinsic/extrinsic for a later and more
detailed paper.
A second objection runs along the following lines: the
solution offered fails to adequately distinguish a failure
of seeing (or sight) from the inability to see. In the case
of inattentional blindness one is failing to see something
but yet they have the ability to see that thing. This is an
important distinction: in fact it is the very difference
between being blind and being able to see perfectly well.
It is only when one lacks the ability to detect visual
stimuli that they are blind. The account provided con-
founds these two phenomena and is thus incorrect.
We think this objection raises a very important point
that we have alluded to earlier. We agree that there is a
distinction to be made between having the ability to see
and failing to notice a feature of the world versus not
having the ability to see. The former typically would not
be considered a case of blindness but the latter surely
would. As we have stated before, the case of inattentional
blindness is interesting and problematic. We have covered
the possibility that inattentional blindness is a case of
blindness and given an account of how that should be
formalized. If the envisioned case driving the objection is
one where the use of ‘blindness’ is metaphorical, then we
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need not and should not explain inattentional blindness as
a type of blindness. If, on the other hand, inattentional
blindness is not a metaphorical blindness (it is an instance
of a non-realized visual disposition), then it will be formal-
ized in the manner other types of blindness are formalized
according to this schema. That is, the disposition will not
be realized in one of two ways: nonconsciously by some
mechanism of contour integration in the early visual
cortex or consciously by a failure of function by the lateral
occipital cortex.
In the case where one fails to see not through an
inability to realize a disposition, but rather a simple
mistake of perception (the objection at hand), this would
firmly fall into a case of metaphorical blindness. If it is
the case that all instances of inattentional blindness are
such failures to see not because of an inability to realize
a disposition, but rather by a mistake of perception, then
inattentional blindness is a metaphorical blindness. If
not, then we have a formalization at the ready.
A third objection can be described in the following
way: One way to explain blindness is that there are many
sub-processes that participate in the more complex
process of vision. When one of these sub-processes does
not occur, then the vision process does not occur. What
is happening in the vision case is complicated, at least in
part because there are fine points regarding processes,
dispositions (functions), and their respective sub-processes
and sub-dispositions (sub-functions). It is the case that
many of the large, easily observable dispositions seem to be
not single dispositions but rather many dispositions work-
ing together. It is more accurate to say that the realization
of many dispositions is a complex of processes, some of
which may themselves constitute realizations of disposi-
tions that, in a way, seem to be sub-dispositions. Indeed
when we consider complex systems like the human visual
system it seems that this more complex picture is closer to
the truth than the simple explanation proffered by the
canonical dispositional picture. For example, the human
visual system contains many components and those com-
ponents each have distinct functions—the function of the
retina is to convert photons to action potentials and the
function of the optic nerve is to transmit the action poten-
tial to the lateral geniculate nucleus and the function of the
primary visual cortex is to integrate the action potentials
and organize that information in such a way that it is intel-
ligible for a human being, etc. Each of these processes could
fail to be realized due to a failure of some mechanism, and
those are the causally responsible entities in the case
of blindness or impaired vision. When we think of
these smaller processes and the material entities they
are dependent upon, we see that color blindness is a
temporary or permanent loss of one of the disposi-
tions of one or more structures of the visual system by
their physical alteration. This view is simpler because
we can explain the disposition of an organism by
appealing to their parts and the realization of sub-pro-
cesses, which is more accurate than simply appealing to
larger-scale dispositions.
We find the approach described in the previous para-
graph problematic for a few reasons. First, the nature of
dispositions in BFO is such that the account this
response posits is insufficiently robust. As we have
discussed, dispositions are such that they cannot be
within the domain or range of the lacks_part relation-
ship. If there is a loss of a disposition or function, we
have to determine how to represent a loss of a dispos-
ition, which is not something we can do simply by
leveraging existing relationships.
Second, one of the problems for such an account is
the nature of functions, which are a special type of
disposition in BFO. It is the case that functions can be
lost under certain circumstances, i.e., under circum-
stances of extreme physical, structural change of the
bearer of the function. However, it is not the case that
any physical change in a bearer of a function such that
the function ceases will entail the loss of the function.
This is the case in BFO as well as cases of vision under
examination in this paper.
For example, a door has a function to open. It is essen-
tial to the proper functioning of the door that its func-
tion is only realized under certain conditions. If the door
opens too easily (under a range of conditions that is too
wide, say such that it opens under the pressure of the
wind), we would still contend that the door bears the
function to open, but that it is malfunctioning (due to a
faulty latch or some such). Likewise, a door can be diffi-
cult to open while retaining its function to open, also
due to some structural alteration. But we would still say
that the door has the function to open (and close) and
that it is malfunctioning. For each of these examples the
door retains its function but the function is realized
under a smaller (or larger) range of conditions (i.e., it
takes more or less force to open the door). The range of
conditions under which a function is realized is reduced
because of an alteration in physical structure of the
bearer of the function. The function of the entity is not
altered, however; its functioning is. In this way a difficult
door is similar to some cases of blindness, in that both
of the entities bearing the function retain that function
even though the function is realized under a broader or
narrower range of conditions.
Now, it could be appropriate to frame such an event
in terms of the various sub-processes or processes rea-
lizing the function (what are called functionings) not
occurring, and this is indeed what is happening. But
such a framing would fail to accurately capture all of a
single type of phenomenon, in our case blindness.
Further, what unites all cases of blindness is not that
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some functioning or another is not occurring, but that
we have as a result a reduction of the range of condi-
tions under which a disposition is realized. Any such
reduction (under a certain threshold) is a case of blind-
ness, no matter what sub-functioning is unrealized. Of
course we may find further subtypes of blindness exist
and these may be demarcated according to the various
underlying physical mechanisms that reduce the range
in conditions under which the vision function is realized,
but this is consistent with our view. In fact it is our view.
In each of the cases discussed, the difference is the
mechanism underlying the reduction in the range of
triggering conditions for the disposition of vision.
Discussion
Given the problems associated with the currently exist-
ing accounts of blindness, we thus propose a new defin-
ition of blindness: blindness is a reduction of the trigger
conditions under which the sight function is realized. If
visual impairment admits of degrees, then it cannot be a
function or disposition. Blindness cannot be a lack of a
disposition or function because many things lack the
function yet should not be classified as blind. The best
option available for defining blindness is to say that sight
is the function to receive photons and interpret them as
visual information and then proceed to define blindness as
a reduction of the conditions under which the disposition
is realized.
One of the consequences of this reasoning is that
many of the terms in various phenotype ontologies
mistakenly refer to entities that are dispositions rather
than qualities. Our goal in this paper is not to demon-
strate that many terms in phenotype ontologies are
mistakenly characterized as denoting qualities rather
than dispositions, but merely that blindness is not a
phenotype. We think that, as is consistent with BFO,
dispositions are not phenotypes and phenotypes are not
dispositions. It would be a mistake to confuse pheno-
types and dispositions. This does not entail that there
are no terms in various phenotype ontologies that
denote dispositions, only that representing a disposition
as a phenotype is incorrect from the perspective of BFO.
While there may have been efforts to annotate data
using 'blindness' in phenotype ontologies in the past, we
feel these efforts are mistaken.
Our approach has certain advantages. First, it accounts
for the graded nature of blindness. The slow and some-
times gradual onset of blindness raises special problems
for ontology construction as it admits of degrees and
seemingly vague boundaries. Second, it classifies sight as
an internally-grounded realizable entity, which makes
use of the framework provided by an upper-level ontol-
ogy such as BFO. Third, it is ontologically innocent in
that there are no new entities to countenance in any
upper-level ontology. The entities referenced by our
solution are already present in BFO so there is no need
to introduce new entities.
Conclusions
The motivation of this project is to provide a simple yet
flexible ontological account of blindness. Since blind-
ness can result from a variety of diseases, the construc-
tion of ontologies that incorporate both blindness and
the diseases that cause blindness, either directly or indir-
ectly, is of importance to the biomedical community.
But this is not a purely classificatory exercise—the
employment of conditions under which a disposition (or
function) is realized is a novel application of a tool that
has been available for ontological developers for some
time. It is the opinion of these authors that this type of
usage could yield further fruitful results.
Endnotes
1Functions in BFO are a special type of disposition.
2Functions do not have parts but the entities that have
functions do have parts.
3Note that the relationship has_trigger is two-place due
to the limitations of formal ontology languages like OWL,
which is only able to handle two-place relationships.
4We leave bound variables uninstantiated for the reader.
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